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Abstract
Several models of intra-household decision making have been suggested
in the literature. One important dichotomy is between non-cooperative and
cooperative models (including speci…c models of bargaining). The other im-
portant distinction is between models that allow for caring and those that
do not. We present a framework that includes all suggested models and vari-
ants as special cases. We derive the theoretical predictions of these models
for the relationship between expenditures on goods and the intra-household
distribution of income. We estimate and test between these relationships
using Canadian household expenditure data. We conclude that there is ev-
idence that both husbands and wives care for each other in the sense that
with an unequal distribution of incomes the high income partner behaves
as a ‘Becker dictator’ and there is local income pooling. We further …nd
that for about half of the households in our sample (those with more equal
incomes) a re-distribution of income would lead to changes in budget allo-
cations. We conclude that the data are consistent with a collective model
with caring partners.
¤We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of Wasif Rasheed to the research presented
in this paper. We are also grateful to Andrew Chesher, Philippe Jéhiel, Arthur Lewbel and
participants at seminars at Inra, Ceras, Bristol, Nu¢eld, Copenhagen and at ESEM in Toulouse
for comments and discussion. We thank the Canadian SSHRC and the Danish Social Science
Research Foundation (SSF) for support.
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1. Introduction
There is now considerable empirical evidence that the distribution of income
within the household makes a di¤erence to many household outcomes (see, for ex-
ample, Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (1993), Browning (1995),
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Lundberg, Pollak and
Wales (1995), Phipps and Burton (1992), Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990)).
This universal rejection of ’income-pooling’ contradicts one of the basic predic-
tions of the ’unitary’ model of household behaviour that posits that the household
behaves as though it has a single objective function. These empirical …ndings,
coupled with the methodological unease that arises from treating an aggregate,
the household, as though it is an individual has lead to a burgeoning literature
on intra-household models. There has not been, however, much work on exactly
which model best describes what goes on inside the household. In this paper we
present a framework that allows us to capture several of the theoretical models
suggested in the literature as special cases. Di¤erent models give di¤erent em-
pirical predictions for the relationship between demands and the distribution of
income within the household. We derive these predictions and provide empirical
tests between them.
Once we allow that individuals within the household may have di¤erent pref-
erences over how to allocate the time and money available to the household we
need to specify a model of within household decision making. In doing this, all
investigators in economics adopt a ‘Beckerian’ framework in which each person in
the household has a utility function de…ned over household outcomes (see Becker
(1991) for a de…nitive statement). The di¤erent models vary in how they allow for
the dependence of household outcomes on these preferences. Basically there are
four broad options for theoretical models: assuming enough to give a single utility
function (unitary) model (see, for example, Becker (1991) and Samuelson (1956));
adopting a bargaining model (see, for example, Manser and Brown (1980), McEl-
roy and Horney (1981), Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Rasheed (1996)); taking
a model which assumes only e¢ciency (the ’collective’ model) (see, for example,
Apps and Rees (1988), Chiappori (1988) and (1992) and Browning and Chiap-
pori (1997)) or adopting some non-cooperative model (see, for example, Leuthold
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(1968), Bourguignon (1984), Ulph (1988), Woolley (1993), Browning (1994) and
Konrad and Lommerud (1995)).
There has been some structural empirical work using one or other model. In
this work speci…cation testing has been con…ned to general speci…cation tests or
to tests of speci…c predictions of the model used. Sometimes, however, the pre-
diction is not unique to that model (formally, we cannot identify which model
is generating our data). The obvious example is the rejection of income pooling
which is generally common to all non-unitary models. The only empirical testing
between di¤erent non-unitary models is that of Kapteyn and Kooreman (1990);
they test between bargaining models, with varying power for both partners, from
”male dictatorship” to ”female dictatorship”, using a linear Engel curve speci…ca-
tion. In this paper we present tests between the unitary model and one variant of
each of the broad classes of models (bargaining, collective and non-cooperative).
The testing is based on a general Engel curve analysis which voids the linearity
assumption of Kapteyn and Kooreman (1990).1 As well as testing between vari-
ous models we also derive and implement tests for the presence of ‘caring’ (in the
speci…c Becker sense given below) within the household.
2. Theory
2.1. Framework
We consider a two person (I = A;B with A being a ‘she’ and B being a ‘he’)
household which faces …xed prices (which we normalise to unity) and allocates a
given total expenditure among di¤erent goods. In the conventional unitary model
we assume the existence of a household utility function and maximise this subject
to the budget constraint. If we drop the assumption that there is a household
utility function then we need to posit some other household decision process. To
stay within the conventional neo-classical (Beckerian) framework, we assume in
all that follows that goods are either public or private and that each person has a
representable preference ordering over the within household allocation of goods.
Formalising, suppose that any good can either be used privately by one or other
person in the household or it is public2. Denote person I’s vector of their private
1We do not attempt to exploit the price variation that we have in the data. For results on
the collective model versus the unitary model using price variation, see Browning and Chiappori
(1996).
2We could allow that goods have the possibility of having both a private and a public nature;
this complicates the notation without adding much.
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good by qI and let the vector of public goods be denoted Q. Let q = qA+ qB be
the vector of household consumption of the private good.
The household budget constraint is:
Q0e+ q0e = x (1)
where e is the appropriately sized unit vector and x is household total expendi-
ture. The most general form for the individual preferences is uI = ÀI
¡
qA;qB ;Q
¢
so that each person cares not only about their own consumption but also the
structure of the other person’s private demands. Such preferences are usually
termed ‘altruistic’. Alternatively we could assume that each person has an indi-
vidualistic felicity function de…ned over public goods and the individual’s private
consumption, ÀI
¡
qI ;Q
¢
, and that preferences are de…ned over the levels of these
felicity functions. Thus uI = ªI
¡
ÀA
¡
qA;Q
¢
; ÀB
¡
qB;Q
¢¢
; following Becker we
refer to such preferences as ‘caring’. In this case person A only cares about B’s
private consumption insofar as it gives him pleasure. Finally we have the case of
‘egotistic’ preferences in which each individual cares only about their own indi-
vidual felicity function: uA = ÀA
¡
qA;Q
¢
and similarly for B. Of course, we can
also have hybrids. For example, Becker’s presentation of the Rotten Kid Theorem
implicitly has one caring person and one egotistic person; we shall return to this
below.
2.2. Modelling the decision process.
Having de…ned the constraints the household faces and the preferences of the
two people we have to model how they resolve di¤erences if the two people have
di¤erent ordinal preferences; that is, if uA 6= F (uB) for some strictly increasing
F (:). There are three broad options: a bargaining model, a model which assumes
only e¢ciency (the ‘collective’ model) or a non-cooperative model. If we assume
that there is enough structure on the bargaining model to give Pareto e¢cient
outcomes (or even use a Nash assumption) then the former of the three cases is
a special case of the second. In the general modelling of interactions between
agents, each approach has it attractions and drawbacks. In the speci…c context
considered here two elements seem particularly relevant. First, the household may
be considered one of the pre-eminent examples of a repeated game with a fairly
stable environment. Second, the two agents can safely be assumed to know each
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other’s preferences (at least after a few years)3. Together these make the use of
non-cooperative models that have outcomes that are not Pareto e¢cient relatively
unattractive. After all, if agents know each other and interact very often, why
should they leave potential Pareto improvements unexploited?
Conversely, the two features mentioned make the collective model a very at-
tractive modelling option. Additionally, the collective model leads to a surprising
number of restrictions on observable outcomes (see Chiappori (1988) and (1992),
Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (1994), Bourguignon, Brown-
ing, Chiappori (1996) and Browning and Chiappori (1998)). The …nal point in
favour of the collective model is that we can identify a good deal of ‘who gets
what’ within the household and how this changes as we change ‘distribution fac-
tors’4 (see Chiappori (1992) and Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechene
(1994)). Distribution factors are variables which do not impact directly on tastes
but that do a¤ect the intra-household allocation decision (and hence household
demands). Potential examples include the relative incomes of household mem-
bers; divorce laws; social attitudes to the roles of men and women and the outside
options of the di¤erent members. The drawback of the collective model is that
it gives no hint of the process whereby members of a household might achieve a
Pareto e¢cient outcome nor where on the utility possibility frontier the household
will be located. More importantly, it gives no guidance as to what variables should
appear in the set of distribution factors. For example, some authors use relative
incomes or relative earnings or relative non-labour incomes. Suppose, however,
that it is relative potential wages that matter; that is, power within the household
is determined not by actual market outcomes but by what the di¤erent agents can
threaten to do. Although the potential wage is correlated with earnings it obvi-
ously di¤ers for those who choose not to participate in the observation period. To
derive more speci…c predictions, we need more structure; typically this will take
the form of assuming a speci…c bargaining model.
If we move to a structured bargaining model then we must specify breakdown
points and outside options which considerably complicates the theoretical analysis
and also makes greater data demands. A number of breakdown points have been
suggested in the literature. These range from divorce (see McElroy and Horney
(1981) and Manser and Brown (1980)) to each person reverting to traditional roles
in the event of no agreement (see Lundberg and Pollak (1992). For the bargaining
3The availability of unobserved consumption - for example, taking leisure on a job - weakens
this argument.
4McElroy (1990) uses the term ’extra-household environmental parameters’.
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model in this paper, we consider one speci…c alternative, namely that the break-
down point for the bargaining game is a non-cooperative voluntary contributions
game; this is presented below. This approach can be justi…ed by an appeal to each
period being one of a number in a repeated game in which the non-cooperative
outcome is used as a disciplining device.
To bring out the implications of the various models, we shall only consider the
e¤ects on the household demands for one private good and one public good (but we
allow that there are many other public and private goods). In doing this we hold
total expenditure and all other in‡uences on preferences constant. For expositional
convenience, we assume that person A prefers the two goods we consider more
than B in the following sense. If we useA’s utility function to determine household
demands (A is a dictator) then the demand for these two goods is higher (and the
demand for some other goods is lower) than if we use B’s utility function. In the
following exposition we shall only present informal derivations; formal statements
of propositions and proofs can be found in Appendix B.
2.3. A cooperative model.
The …rst case we consider is the collective model which assumes only that any
intra-household allocation is e¢cient. Formally,
³
q^A; q^B; Q^
´
is e¢cient if there is
no other allocation that satis…es the same budget constraint that makes one person
strictly better o¤ without making the other one worse o¤. This is equivalent to
household demands being rationalised by the household utility function:
V (q;Q;¹) = max
qA;qB
©
¹ÀA
¡
qA;qB;Q
¢
+ (1¡ ¹)ÀB ¡qA;qB;Q¢ j qA + qB = qª
(2)
This household utility function resembles the conventional utility function except
that it allows for the in‡uence of the weight on the individuals’ utility functions. If
the weighting factor ¹ is a constant then this is simply the unitary model. Gener-
ally, however, the weight will depend on various (distribution) factors that re‡ect
the ‘power’ of the respective partners. In all that follows, we shall concentrate on
the share of earnings of person A; that is,
½ =
YA
YA + YB
where YI is the earnings of person I. For the collective model we shall assume that
the weighting function ¹ is a strictly increasing function of ½. There is no explicit
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prior non-cooperative game that justi…es this assumption; rather it is implicitly
based on a bargaining model in which a higher share of household earnings is
re‡ected in a more favourable breakdown point5. We shall discuss the possible
endogeneity of the earnings share in the empirical section.
The …rst model (model 1) we consider is that in which preferences are egotistic;
in this case the demand for both private and public goods is increasing in ½, given
the assumption that A prefers these two goods. For convenience, we have taken
demands to be linear; see the top panels of …gure 1. If we introduce caring (model
2) then we have that for extreme values of the earnings share the high income
person is e¤ectively making transfers to the low income person and demands
are locally independent of the distribution of earnings. This is one version of
Becker’s ‘Rotten Kid Theorem’ so we refer to the intervals at the ends of the
earnings distribution as the ’Becker’ region. The bottom panels of …gure 1 give an
illustration of the predictions of the caring collective model. Note that the Becker
regions are the same for all goods ([0; 0:25] and [0:5; 1] in the case illustrated).
2.4. A non-cooperative model.
The non-cooperative model we consider is one in which each person makes volun-
tary contributions to the public good and their own private good from their own
earnings (see Ulph (1988), Woolley (1993) and Rasheed (1996)). It is assumed
that there is no other income (or that other income is distributed proportionately
to earnings). We consider …rst the egotistic case (model 3). If B has all the earn-
ings (½ = 0) then the household buys the amount of public and private goods that
maximise his utility function subject to purchases equalling his earnings. Note
that at this point the household allocations are e¢cient since we cannot re-arrange
them, keeping total expenditure constant, without making B worse o¤. If, now, a
small amount of the earnings of person B are transferred to person A then B re-
duces his expenditure on all private goods (assuming normality) and also reduces
his contribution to the public good. However, A does not contribute anything
to the public good but rather concentrates her expenditures on her own private
goods. Thus the contribution to all public goods actually falls even though A
prefers the public good relative to B. This is a seemingly paradoxical result and
lends itself well to testing. Note that the new allocations are now ine¢cient since
5This lack of an explicit model is a weakness. Suppose, for example, that the weight ¹
depends on relative earnings and some other factor re‡ecting A’s household ’power’. If the
latter increases then Amay decrease her earnings without ¹ decreasing.
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Figure 1: Cooperative Model Predictions
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Figure 2: Non Cooperative Model Predictions
it would be possible to make both agents better o¤ by increasing their contribu-
tions to the public good; this is the standard ine¢ciency result for a voluntary
contributions game with public goods.
As more earnings are transferred to A, at some point she starts contributing
to the public good. If B is still contributing to the public good at that point
then we have the surprising and remarkable result due to Warr (1983) (see also
Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and Bernheim (1986)). This result states
that if a group of agents are all voluntarily contributing to a public good then
small re-distributions of income will not lead to any changes in the allocation
to any public or private goods. In the context here, this means that we have a
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central region for the distribution of earnings in which household demands are
independent of the distribution of earnings; we term this the Warr region. As we
continue to increase A’s share of earnings, at some point B stops contributing to
any public good and at that point any further transfer to A will lead to rising
contributions to all public goods and any private goods she prefers more than B.
The set of predictions is given in the top panels of Figure 26. The Warr interval
in this illustration is (0:25; 0:5).
One example of this is if there are children in the household and both parents
care for the children. Suppose they agree on the utility function of the children
(even though they may give that utility level di¤erent weights in their own indi-
vidual welfare functions). Then goods that are bought exclusively for the child
(for example, children’s clothing) are a public good. If A cares more about the
children than does B then more will be spent on children’s clothing if A has all
the earnings than would be the case if B had all the earnings. If, however, we
start from B having all the earnings and then we make a small transfer to A (so
that total earnings are held constant) then she will decide to spend this on private
goods for herself (her own clothing, for example) rather than on any public goods,
including children’s clothing. Thus such a transfer may lead to an increase in ex-
penditures on women’s clothing and a decrease for children’s clothing since at the
same time B will cut back his spending on children. Thus children are actually
worse o¤ even though the parent who cares more for them has a higher relative
income.
If we now introduce caring between A and B (model 4) then we once again have
‡at Becker regions at either end of the earnings distribution; see the bottom panels
of Figure 2. This non-cooperative context is, actually, the one in which Becker
introduced his neutrality result. Note that the motivation for the ‡at portions in
the middle and the two at the extreme are very di¤erent. In the latter one person
is acting as a benevolent dictator and outcomes are e¢cient whilst in the central
region each person is acting sel…shly and outcomes are ine¢cient. Note, once
again, the coincidence of ‘join’ points across goods; that is, all demands start and
stop being ‡at at the same values of ½ (f0:2; 0:3; 0:5; 0:65g in this illustration).
6If B stops contributing to all public goods before A starts then the ‡at ’Warr’ segment
simply disappears.
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2.5. A bargaining model with a non-cooperative breakdown point.
As we emphasised in our discussion of the decision process earlier in this section,
we do not …nd ine¢cient outcomes very appealing in the household context. In this
sub-section we consider a bargaining model which has a non-cooperative outcome
as its breakdown point. This follows Lundberg and Pollak (1993) but we take a
di¤erent non-cooperative game than they did. Lundberg and Pollak consider a
’traditional spheres’ game in which there are two public goods but each person
can only contribute to one of them. Here we take the non-cooperative game of the
previous sub-section as the breakdown point; this seems to us the more natural
starting point.
Rasheed (1996) shows that the one shot bargaining game that results from a
traditional Nash bargaining game is a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a repeated
game with full information in which agents play the one shot game over and over
again. Thus the bargaining model considered here is of considerable interest as
being the only bargaining game in this context that formally captures the twin
features that agents interact regularly and know each other well.
The question is: what properties does the bargaining outcome inherit from
the non-cooperative game? For the egotistic case (model 5), Rasheed (1996)
shows that the ‡at ’Warr’ portion for public and private goods appears for the
bargaining outcome. This follows since in the Warr interval the breakdown point is
locally independent of the distribution of earnings and hence the …nal bargained
outcome must also be independent. However, since the bargaining outcome is
e¢cient, it cannot be the case that the non-monotonicity in the earnings share
is also inherited. Instead, starting from A having no earnings, as her share of
earnings increases so does her bargaining position and hence the household ends
up buying more of the public goods she prefers. Thus the public good and private
goods are both non-decreasing; see the top panels of …gure 3. As can be seen, the
predictions for the two types of goods are the same; for goods A prefers we have
a strictly increasing segment followed by a ‡at portion and then another strictly
increasing segment. If we now introduce caring (model 6) then this simply adds
Becker regions at the ends of the distribution see the bottom panel on …gure 3.
In this section we have derived predictions for demands for public and private
goods under three di¤erent models for the determination of budget allocations.
We have also shown that caring introduces ‡at regions at the extremes of the
income distribution. We turn now to testing between these various predictions.
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Figure 3: Bargaining Model Predictions
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3. Empirical results.
3.1. Data.
The data are taken from the Canadian Family Expenditure Survey (FAMEX)
for sampled years between 1969 to 1992. Here we give only a brief account of
sample selection and data preparation; full details and a data description can be
found in Appendix C. We shall consider only households that are headed by a
married couple and in which both the husband and wife are in full-year full-time
employment. We also select on there being at least one child aged less than 17
in the household and no other members aged 17 or over. The selection on a child
being present is because we want to examine expenditures on children’s clothing.
The exclusion of households with adult children present is because the two decision
maker framework may not be appropriate if there are more than two adults. We
excluded households with no expenditure on food at home, household operations
and the three clothing categories but not those with zero alcohol and tobacco.
We excluded households with high budget shares for any good. Finally we found
that the model was unstable for very low values of the wife’s share of earnings
so we exclude households in which this share is less than …ve percent. After all
these selections we are left with 2029 households in our sample. We account for
relative price e¤ects and a variety of demographic factors that are usually thought
to modify preferences; these include age, the number and ages of children, region
of residence and education; a full listing is given in Table A1. Finally we note that
in constructing budget shares we used the ratio of individual good expenditures
to total non-durable expenditure.
Since the models’ predictions consist in restrictions on the relationship between
the distribution of income within the household and demand, we start by the
former: see …gure 4.As we might expect the distribution of the wife’s share of
household income is concentrated below one half with quantiles of 0:33; 0:40 and
0:48. The proportion of women with earnings higher than their partner is 18:2%
with less than two percent earning more than twice their husband (a share of
0:66). Consequently we must not expect too much precision in testing for e¤ects
at the high end of the distribution.
3.2. Empirical methods.
In the theory section we developed three models: a collective model; a non-
cooperative model and a bargaining model with the non-cooperative outcome
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Figure 4: Distribution of wife’s share of income
as a breakdown point. For each of these we have predictions for the demands for
public and private goods with and without caring. Our approach to testing be-
tween these models will be to identify ex ante some public and some private goods
and then to test for the various predictions. For public goods we take ‘children’s
clothing’ and ‘household operations’ (which includes water, fuel, electricity and
telephone but not child care expenses). For private goods we consider ‘food at
home’; ‘vices’ (that is, alcohol and tobacco); ‘men’s clothing’ and ‘women’s cloth-
ing’. Although this is not exhaustive of non-durables and services we consider the
classi…cation of other goods (such as ‘food outside the home’ and ‘entertainment’)
as private or public too conjectural to make it feasible to use them. The six goods
we model account for about one half of total expenditures on non-durables.
We assume that all the households have the same decision process and that
the population is homogenous enough in terms of level of total income so that the
join points are the same for everyone.7 Let ½ be the share of income of the wife.
We take the unrestricted form of the models to be:
7We modelled and estimated some speci…cations with heterogeneity in the join points. These
never gave a signi…cantly better …t than the corresponding models with homogeneity reported
below.
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E[!i jX; ½] = X¯ + g(½) (3)
where !i is the budget shares for good i, X is the matrix of explanatory variables
other than ½ and g is a function describing the relationship between the share of
income of the wife and the response wi.8 In equation (3) the matrixX contains log
prices, demographics and the logarithm of total expenditure (x) and its square.
There are several ways suggested in the literature for estimating a partially
linear structure such as (3) (see for example, Robinson (1988) and Härdle (1990)).
These are not easily adapted to the GMM system framework we use here to take
account of the endogeneity of total expenditure. Instead we adopt a ‡exible
procedure that …rst involves estimating an unrestricted form of equation (3) using
GMM applied to X and splines of ½. Speci…cally we divide the sample sorted by
½ into 20 equally sized groups (with 19 join points) and construct 20 variables
that give a piecewise linear and continuous function of the wife’s share. We then
include these variables on the right hand side of our equation (along with the
X variables) and in the set of instruments. We instrument the total expenditure
variables with log net income and its square. Thus we have a just identi…ed, linear
unrestricted system with dim(X)+20 right hand side variables for each equation.
This can be estimated using GMM in the usual way; the weighting matrix from
this unrestricted model is used in all subsequent testing of restricted models. We
have 120 share coe¢cients in the unrestricted model; with the sample size to hand
this obviously leads to very imprecise estimates but that does not matter since we
are only using the unrestricted model for testing heavily restricted variants.
To test for the various models developed in the theory section, we use a
minimum-Â2 procedure that restricts sets of coe¢cients on the unrestricted ½
splines to be the same. To illustrate, consider testing for a one join model (with
the same join point for all 6 goods) with a ‡at segment and then a slope. This
corresponds to a collective model in which husbands care for their wives (so that
the initial ‡at segment is a Becker region) but wives do not care for husbands.
There are only 7 share coe¢cients for this model: the single join point and the
6 slope coe¢cients. If we …x the join point at one of the 19 join points from
the unrestricted system then we have a model that is nested in the unrestricted
8We made attempts to allow for the possible endogeneity of the income share ½ by running
speci…cations with this share instrumented. As instruments we tried crossed region and year
dummies and also measures of relative wages for full-time employed men and women in the
region-year. In no case could we reject exogeneity. On the other hand, the instruments are
relatively weak and this test can hardly be considered conclusive.
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model. For example, if we take the fourth join point then our ‡at-slope structure
implies that the coe¢cients on the …rst four coe¢cients in each equation are zero
and the last sixteen coe¢cients equal within each equation. This gives 24+90¡1
restrictions (the ¡1 is to allow for the join point being estimated). The Â2 test
statistic for these restrictions is readily calculated using minimum-Â2 methods.
To …nd the optimal join point we grid search over the 19 join points from the un-
restricted model and take the value that gives the minimum of the 19 statistics as
the optimal value. This approach has the disadvantage that we have not treated
the income share as a continuous variable. On the other hand, this procedure
is feasible and reasonably fast and is likely to give results that are close to the
‘correct’ since we have taken a relatively …ne grid for the unrestricted model.9
3.3. Empirical results.
The …rst step is to estimate the unrestricted model. Then we need to test the
restrictions from the theory section. Even with the minimum-Â2 grid search
method outlined above, estimation of models with more than two join points
is very cumbersome. Consequently we estimated a relatively small number of re-
stricted models. We estimate all three one join models (‘‡at-slope’, ‘slope-‡at’
and ‘slope-slope’) and three two join models (‘‡at-slope-‡at’, ‘slope-‡at-slope’
and ‘slope-slope-slope’) From these we choose a statistically preferred model and
then test whether particular variants of this model give an improvement. The
variants we use for this are two three join models with ‘slope-‡at-slope-‡at’ and
‘‡at-slope-‡at-slope’. Table 1 presents the results for these models and the uni-
tary and collective models. The criterion values given in the Table provide tests
of the given models against the unrestricted model. The di¤erences in the Â2
criteria between nested models give the test statistics for the restriction. For ex-
ample, comparing the unitary and the collective (with no caring) model we see
that the 6 restrictions to go from the latter to the former have a Â2 statistic of
29: 4 which has a probability of less than 0:01% under the null that the unitary
model is correct. This is the usual rejection of income pooling. To conduct our
testing, we begin with the least restricted two join model which has 20 parameters.
As can be seen from the Table, neither of the two join models with one or two
‡at segments can be rejected against this more general model (Â2(6) = 7:1 and
Â2(12) = 11:7 respectively). The slope-‡at-slope model can be simpli…ed to the
one join slope-slope model (Â2(1) = 0:6). This latter model, however, is in turn
9Limited experiments with …ner grids gave similar qualitative results.
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rejected against the slope-‡at model (a Â2 (6) of 8). Thus following this branch
we conclude that the slope-‡at is preferred. On the other hand, all of the sim-
pler models are rejected against the ‡at-slope-‡at model. The restrictions of the
‡at-slope-‡at model to the slope-‡at and ‡at-slope models have Â2(1) statistics
of 4 and 10:2 respectively. Importantly, the collective model with no caring is
also decisively rejected (Â2(2) = 10:2 with a probability of less than 0:5%). We
conclude that the ‡at-slope-‡at model is the statistically preferred model.
Our preferred ‡at-slope-‡at model has a Â2(107) statistic of 127:8 so that the
preferred model is not rejected against the very unstructured general model. It
may be, however, that some model with more than two joins is preferred to the
‡at-slope-‡at model. As stated above it is very onerous to grid search over more
than two join points so we consider only two three join point alternatives. These
add a slope before and after the ‡at-slope-‡at model to give sl-‡-sl-‡ and ‡-sl-‡-sl
respectively. Referring again to Table 1 we see that both of these are not rejected
against the ‡at-slope-‡at two join model (Â2(7) values of 4: 6 and 8: 4). Thus our
preferred model is also not rejected against less restricted, parsimonious variants.
The preferred model suggests that both husbands and wives display sharing.
The join points given in Table 1 (0:21 and 0:43) are at the 10th and 60th per-
centiles of the income share distribution. Thus about a half of the households have
relative incomes such that a re-distribution of income would lead to a change in
budget allocations. In Tables D1 to D6 in Appendix D we present the parameter
estimates for the ‡at-slope-‡at model. In Table 2 we present the coe¢cient esti-
mates for the collective models with and without sharing and in …gures 2 to 7 we
present the predictions for the budget shares conditional on the sharing variable
for the collective model with and without sharing. The …rst thing to note is that
for those goods for which we had a prior on the slopes, this prior is con…rmed.
Thus women and children’s clothing is increasing in the wife’s share and men’s
clothing and vices are decreasing. We also …nd that food at home and services
are decreasing in the wife’s share.
A second feature of the parameter estimates of both models is that they indi-
cate fairly substantial changes for some allocations consequent on a re-distribution
of within household income. To illustrate, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 we present
the budget share estimates for values of ½ equal to 0:25 and 0:75. In column three
we give the di¤erence proportional to the mean budget share. As can be seen, for
our preferred model the budget shares for women’s clothing and children’s cloth-
ing rise by about 11% and 8% respectively whilst the shares for men’s clothing
and vices fall by about 6% and 5% respectively.
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4. Conclusions.
We have presented a theoretical analysis of the predictions of di¤erent models
of intra-household decision processes on budget allocations. In particular, we
derived the restrictions on the relationship between demands and the wife’s share
of income for four di¤erent models. We have shown that the di¤erent models
give rise to radically di¤erent qualitative predictions which lend themselves well
to testing. In the empirical section we used Canadian family expenditure survey
data to test between the alternatives. Our main conclusions are:
² We do not …nd any evidence for a ‡at region surrounded by slope regions -
that is, an interior region of (Warr) pooling. We interpret this as evidence
against both non-cooperative behaviour and a bargaining game with non-
cooperative behaviour as a breakdown point.
² We …nd robust evidence of caring by both husbands and wives. Speci…cally,
we …nd that when the distribution of income is skewed the high income
partner behaves as though he or she is a dictator who cares for the other
partner. This (local) income pooling is the behaviour posited by Becker in
his Rotten Kid theorem.
² Although we …nd evidence for caring we also …nd that for about half of our
sample the distribution of household income is such that income pooling
fails. In this central region a re-distribution of household income would lead
to a change in the budget allocations.
² We …nd that households in which the wife has a high income share spend
relatively more on women’s and children’s clothing (increases of 11% and 8%
respectively for a change in the share from 0:25 to 0:75) and relatively less
on men’s clothing and alcohol and tobacco (falls of 6% and 5% respectively).
The major reservations we have about these conclusions are that we have
treated the income share as exogenous and we have assumed that everyone has
the same decision process and the same parameters for that process. As we have
mentioned above, we tried to take account of these two shortcomings but there was
no evidence that either was important. On the other hand, we have a relatively
small sample and the data are rather noisy so we suspect that the negative …ndings
on endogeneity and heterogeneity may be more due to a lack of power in our tests.
Even allowing for this, however, it is clear that the simple collective model without
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caring is rejected and that more structured models of intra-household behaviour
are needed. In particular, it seems that we should allow that husband and wife
care for each other, although not completely.
A. Tables
Table 1: Test results.
Number of ½
Model Join 1 Join2 Join 3 parameters Criterion
Unitary ¡ ¡ ¡ 0 167:4
Collective (no caring) ¡ ¡ ¡ 6 138:0
Flat-slope 0:21 ¡ ¡ 7 138:0
Slope-‡at 0:43 ¡ ¡ 7 131:8
Slope-slope 0:43 ¡ ¡ 13 123:8
Flat-slope-‡at 0:21 0:43 ¡ 8 127:8
Slope-‡at-slope 0:43 0:58 ¡ 14 123:2
Slope-slope-slope 0:33 0:34 ¡ 20 116:1
Fl-sl-‡-sl 0:21 0:43 0:58 15 119:4
Sl-‡-sl-‡ 0:43 0:51 0:54 15 123:2
Table 2: Slope parameter estimates.
No sharing With sharing
Food at home ¡2:17 ¡3:89
[2:2] [2:3]
Services ¡0:43 ¡2:52
[0:6] [2:0]
Women’s clothing 1:54 3:31
[3:1] [3:7]
Men’s clothing ¡0:31 ¡1:34
[0:8] [2:0]
Children’s clothing 1:01 1:54
[2:8] [2:6]
Vices ¡1:45 ¡1:42
[1:8] [1:0]
Values in [:] are absolute t-statistics
19
Table 3: Budget share predictions
Proportional
Model ½ = 0:25 ½ = 0:75 di¤erence (%)
Food No join 21:12 20:04 ¡5:0
Two join 21:51 20:80 ¡3:3
Services No join 12:88 12:66 ¡1:7
Two join 12:88 12:42 ¡3:5
Women’s clothing No join 5:90 6:67 +14:0
Two join 5:65 6:25 +10:9
Men’s clothing No join 3:76 3:60 ¡4:1
Two join 3:78 3:54 ¡6:3
Children’s clothing No join 3:82 4:32 +14:1
Two join 3:63 3:91 +7:9
Vices No join 5:17 4:46 ¡13:1
Two join 5:48 5:22 ¡4:7
All budget share values multiplied by 100.
The terms ‘no join’ and ‘two join’ refer to the collective model without
and with caring respectively.
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B. Theory appendix
We use the same notation as before. Subscripts A and B refer to the two members
of the household; qi represents the vector of private goods consumed by individual
i and Q the vector of public goods consumed in the household. Both private and
public goods are normal. Preferences can be sel…sh or caring. The household
budget constraint is:
e0
¡
qA + qB
¢
+ e0Q = YA + YB = Y
where Yi is individual i’s income and e is the approriately sized vector of ones.
For expositional convenience, we assume savings away. We also assume that the
level of household income is su¢cient to ensure positive expenditure on the public
good.
B.1. Non Cooperative model
Household decisions are described by a Nash equilibrium with voluntary contri-
butions to the public goods. The properties of this game are well known. In
particular, under the assumption of strict convexity of preferences, an equilibrium
exists. Under the assumption that both the private and the public goods are nor-
mal, this equilibrium is unique. This doesn’t seem to be too strong a requirement,
especially with broad grouping of goods such as is the case here. Formal proofs
can be found in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986). Finally, if both partners
have some income and if at least one person is contributing to the public good,
the outcome of this game is ine¢cient. This is due to the fact that agents do not
account for the externality induced by the public good, that is, it is due both to
the assumption of sel…sh preferences and to the absence of coordination between
household members in this game. Note that the outcome is e¢cient when all the
income goes to one member.
We …rst consider the case where both agents’ preferences are sel…sh; then the
case where one of the agents’ preferences are caring while the other’s are sel…sh;
and …nally the case where both agents’ preferences are caring. We assume that
there is one private good and one public good.
B.1.1. Both members sel…sh
Each individual maximises utility Ui = vi(qi; Q), taking the choices of individual
j as given, and choices are subject to the individual’s budget constraint. Each
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individual contributes an amount gi to the public good, so that gi + qi = Yi; i =
A;B and Q = gA + gB: The results shown are also valid if Q = f(gA + gB)
, but not necessarily for the more general case where Q = f (gA; gB): In other
words, we consider only pure public goods. Transfers between household members
are impossible in this setting which combines sel…sh preferences and independent
decision making (given the choices of the other member).
The …rst order conditions of this problem lead to:
vqi ¸ vQi for i = A;B,
leading respectively to interior and corner solutions for each individual:8<: v
q
i = v
Q
i
bqi < Yi bgi > 0
vxi > v
Q
i
bqi = Yi bgi = 0
We rule out the case where the marginal utility of the private good is strictly
lower than that of the public good.
There are therefore 3 possibilities for the household: both members contribute
to the public good, or either member (A or B) contributes while the other one
doesn’t (B or A).
Income Pooling Proposition 1 : For this Nash equilibrium, if both individuals
are contributing to the public good, there is income pooling.
Proof: If both individuals are contributing to the public good, individual B’s
problem can be written as:
max
qB
vB(q
B; YA + YB ¡ qA ¡ qB)
For an interior solution, and for small reallocations of income between A and
B, the problem, and hence its solution are unchanged.
For this property to hold, the reallocations of income have to be small enough
so that the household stays at an interior solution; in other words, such that both
household members continue to contribute to the public good. This result (with
di¤erent proofs) can be found in Warr(1983) and in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
(1986).
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If there is only one contributor to the public good, then reallocations of income
between household members do have an e¤ect on outcomes, i.e. on the structure
of expenditure. Indeed, if B is not contributing, then:
vB(YB; YA ¡ qA) ¸ vB(YB ¡ "; YA ¡ qA + ")
Evolution of expenditure as a function of income shares Let the share
of household income accruing to member A be denoted by:
½ = Y
A
Y A+Y B
Let ½1 be the value of ½ such that for smaller values of A ’s share of income, B
is the only contributor to the public good. Let ½2 be the value of ½ such that for
larger values of A ’s share of income, A is the only contributor to the public good.
For values of ½ between ½1 and ½2, both individuals contribute to the public good,
and we have shown that there is income pooling. The evolution of the quantities
demanded of public and private goods when the share of income varies are directly
deduced from the assumption that all goods are normal.
Contrib- Range Evolution of Indirect
utors to Q: of ½ expenditure Utility
B [0; ½1] @q
A
@½
> 0; @q
B
@½
< 0; vA(½Y; (1¡ ½)Y )
@G
@½
= @g
B
@½
< 0 vB((1¡ ½)Y; (1¡ ½)Y )
A and B [½1; ½2] @q
A
@½
= @q
B
@½
= @G
@½
= 0 vA(Y; Y ); vB(Y; Y )
A [½2; 1] @q
A
@½
> 0; @q
B
@½
< 0; vA(½Y; ½Y )
@G
@½
= @g
A
@½
> 0 vB((1¡ ½)Y; ½Y )
These results give rise to the picture presented in the text.
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B.1.2. One caring individual
Assume, for instance, that A is sel…sh and B is caring. Preferences can be written:
UA = vA(q
A; Q) and UB = F (vA(qA;Q); vB(qB ;Q))
The game remains the same as in the previous case, save for the fact that
the structure of the preferences opens the possibility of income transfers from
the caring individual to the sel…sh individual. A ’s choices are made subject to
qA + gA = YA + t, where t > 0 is the transfer made to A by B. B ’s choices now
include the amount transferred to A and are made subject to qB + gB + t = YB.
The results in this case conform to the intuition conveyed by the form of the
preferences. When the sel…sh individual is relatively poor, the caring individual
will transfer money to him. As the share of household income held by the self-
ish individual increases, the transfers decrease up to a point where they become
zero. Over part of the range with positive transfers, only the caring individual
contributes to the public good. Then transfers cease, and then (or at the same
point, depending on preferences), both individual start contributing to the public
good. At the other extreme, when the sel…sh individual controls a large enough
share of the income of the household, he becomes the only contributor to the
household public good., and in this case also there is no transfer. Indeed, the
transfer can only be positive, i.e. the sel…sh individual will never transfer to the
caring individual.
For individual B, the …rst order conditions of this problem lead to:
@F
@vB
@vB
@qB
¸ @F
@vA
@vA
@Q
+
@F
@vB
@vB
@Q
There are 3 cases, depending upon whether one or both individual contribute
to the public good. We can substitute out for private good demands and write the
utility of the caring individual in terms of incomes, transfers, and contributions
as:
UB = F (vA(YA + bt¡ cgA;cgA +cgB); vB(YB ¡ bt¡ cgB;cgA +cgB))
We will be using the expression of the partial derivative of individual B ’s
utility with respect to the transfer to …nd out when the transfer is positive. In all
cases:
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@UB=@t = F1v
q
A ¡ F2vqB
Case 1: Both individuals contribute to the public good. Using the fact that we
are at an interior solution, we can rewrite @UB=@t = ¡F2vGB < 0: Therefore,
if both individuals are contributing to the public good, the transfers are
zero.
Case 2: The sel…sh individual is the only contributor. In this case, @UB=@t <
¡F2vGB < 0; so that here as in the previous case the optimal level of transfers
is zero.
Case 3: The caring individual is the only contributor to the household public
good. Replacing in the expression of the partial derivative of B ’s utility
with respect to the transfer, we get @UB=@t = F1(v
q
A ¡ vGA) ¡ F2vGB : Both
terms in this expression are positive. The expression can be either positive or
negative. If B values marginally more the disequilibrium for A than his/her
own marginal satisfaction from the public good, transfers will be positive;
otherwise transfers will be zero. The case of positive transfers which appears
here is the case described by Becker (1981) as providing foundation for the
unitary model of household behavior.
To summarize, if the transfers are positive, then we know that the individual
transferring is also the only contributor to the public good. Note that this is not
an equivalence: there can exist a range of the distribution over which the caring
individual is the only contributor but doesn’t transfer. If the transfers are zero,
then either both are contributing or only one is.
Income Pooling If the transfers are positive, then household income is pooled.
Indeed in this case, small reallocations of income between household members
can be compensated by changes in the level of transfer. As the share of income of
the poor individual increases, the transfer decreases, leaving all else unchanged.
Income pooling can also emerge, as in the egotistic case, if both individuals con-
tribute to the public good.
Evolution of expenditure as a function of income share Let ½1 and ½2
represent the same critical values for the income share of A as in the previous
case. We introduce another critical value for ½ here: it is the value of the share of
income of member A below which transfers are positive. We have:
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Contributors Evolution of
to Q: Range of ½ Transfers Expenditure
B [0; ½0] bt > 0 @qA
@½
= @q
B
@½
= @G
@½
= 0
B [½0; ½1] bt = 0 @qA
@½
> 0; @q
B
@½
< 0; @G
@½
= @g
B
@½
< 0
A and B [½1; ½2] bt = 0 @qA
@½
= @q
B
@½
= @G
@½
= 0
A [½2; 1] bt = 0 @qA
@½
> 0; @q
B
@½
< 0; @G
@½
= @g
A
@½
> 0
B.1.3. Both members caring
Following the analysis in the previous paragraph, it is obvious that the assumption
of mutual caring leads to a third range of values for the income share where
household income is pooled.
Note that we have shown that income pooling can emerge as a local property
of demand under 2 types of circumstances: 1) ”à la Becker”, essentially because of
the caring hypothesis in a non cooperative context, 2) in the Warr region, because
of the interdependency introduced by the presence of the public good in both
members, when both are contributing to the public good.
B.1.4. Multiple public goods
The income pooling result holds over the range of the intra-household distrib-
ution where both household members jointly contribute to all the public goods
(Bergstrom, Blume and Varian, 1986) and, with caring preferences, over a range
of the intra-household distribution where resources are unequal.
B.2. Bargaining model with non cooperative breakdown point
We now consider the case where household decisions are obtained as solutions of a
Nash bargaining game, in which the threat point is the solution of the non coop-
erative Nash equilibrium of the previous section. Under the standard assumptions
on individual utility functions, the solution to a bargaining problem of this sort
exists, is unique and e¢cient.
Preferences are assumed to be sel…sh for both individuals in the …rst case,
and then either sel…sh for one individual and caring for the other or caring for
both household members. The question is: what properties does the solution of
this cooperative game inherit from the non cooperative threat point. The results,
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presented here for the case with one private good and one public good generalise
to the case of multiple public goods.
B.2.1. Both members sel…sh
Each individual’s preferences are de…ned as previously on her/his consumption
of private goods and on the household public good, Ui = vi(qi; Q): Choices are
subject to the household budget constraint. The Nash bargaining problem can be
written as:
maxqA;qB;Q
£
vA(qA; Q)¡ vA
¤ £
vB(qB ; Q)¡ vB
¤
such that qA + qB +Q = Y A + Y B = Y
Income pooling The Warr region of income pooling is inherited by the Nash
solution. To show this, rather than working from the Nash program as it is written
just above, it is easier to start from the de…nition of the Nash solution as Nash
had formulated it. The Nash solution is entirely de…ned by a Pareto frontier and
a pair of threat points.
Proposition 2: The Nash solution inherits the Warr region of income pooling from
the threat point.
Proof: Since the Pareto frontier depends only on household income, the Nash
solution will depend on household income and whatever de…nes the threat point.
Hence in the region where the threat point depends only on household income, so
will the Nash solution, since it is unique. Similarly, in the region where the threat
point depend upon the repartition of income, the Nash solution will depend upon
the repartition of income between household members.
Evolution of expenditure as a function of the income share There re-
mains to examine what is the behavior of the expenditure on the public good
outside the [½1; ½2] interval. For this, we need an additional assumption on indi-
vidual preferences: we assume that member A relatively cares more for the public
good than does member B: Outside the Warr region, the threat point depends on
the distribution of income, therefore so does the bargaining solution. However, as
the share of income of individual A increases, so does that individual’s bargaining
power, so that the expenditure on A0s private goods as well as on the public goods
that A cares for relatively more than B; does increase.
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Contributors Evolution of
to Q: Range of ½ Expenditure
B or A [0; ½1] [ [½2; 1] @qA
@½
> 0; @q
B
@½
< 0; @G
@½
> 0
A and B [½1; ½2] @q
A
@½
= @q
B
@½
= @G
@½
= 0
B.2.2. One caring individual or both members caring
The assumption of caring preferences by one or both members adds a region of
income pooling when intra-household resources are unequally distributed, ”a la
Becker”.
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C. Data description.
The Canadian FAMEX is a multi-staged strati…ed clustered survey that collects
information on annual expenditures, incomes, labour supply and demographics
for individual households. The survey is run in the Spring after the survey year
(that is, the information for 1978 was collected in Spring 1979). The survey years
are 1969, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990 and 1992. All of the information is
collected by interview so that the expenditure and income data are subject to recall
bias. Although this may give rise to problems, the FAMEX surveying method
has the great advantage that information on annual expenditures is collected.
Thus the FAMEX has much less problem with infrequency bias than do surveys
based on short diaries. It is also the case that since the survey year coincides
with the tax year (January to December) the income information is thought to
be unusually reliable since it is collected at about the time that Canadians are
…ling their (individual) tax returns. These are often explicitly referenced by the
enumerators.
Prices are taken from Statistics Canada. When composite commodities are
created, the new composite commodity price is the weighted geometric mean of
the component prices with budget shares averaged across our sample for weights.
Table C1 gives the sample selection path followed; the principal selection is
on both husband and wife being in full-time employment and their being at least
one child present.
Table C1: Sample selection
Numbers in sample
Couples with children 17; 848
Both in full-time employment 2; 815
Both partners have positive incomes 2; 799
No adult children 2; 298
Drop zero and high budget shares 2; 034
Wife’s share > 0:05 2; 029
Tables C2 and C3 present sample means and other statistics for all of the
variables used in the analysis (except for the prices).
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Table C2: BUDGET SHARES AND INCOMES.
BUDGET SHARES Mean Standard deviation
FOOD AT HOME 21:67 6:9
HOUSEHOLD OPERATIONS 12:99 4:5
WOMEN’S CLOTHING 5:1 3:3
MEN’S CLOTHING 3:83 2:4
CHILDREN’S CLOTHING 3:57 2:2
VICES 5:53 4:5
HOUSEHOLD NET INCOME* 54; 867 18; 600
HUSBAND’S GROSS EARNINGS* 41; 423 19; 553
WIFE’S GROSS EARNINGS* 27; 822 13; 343
WIFE’S SHARE 0:40 0:12
TOTAL NONDURABLE EXPENDITURE* 30; 239 9; 703
* All values in 1992 Canadian dollars.
Table C3: MEANS OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
MEAN
ATLANTIC 0:206
QUEBEC 0:183
PRAIRIES 0:231
B.C. 0:077
HOMEOWNER 0:796
CITY DWELLER 0:720
HUSBAND’S AGE 36:1
WIFE’S AGE 33:6
NUMBER OF YOUNG CHILDREN 0:36
NUMBER OF OLDER CHILDREN 1:45
MORE THAN HIGH SCHOOL* 0:542
FRANCOPHONE* 0:189
ALLOPHONE* 0:153
* Refers to husband.
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D. Detailed results.
Table D 1: Parameter Estimates of the Caring Collective Model.
Flat-slope-‡at model
Food at home
Coe¢cient Standard Error T-Value
Constant 37.944 27.261 1.392
Age 1.431 0.342 4.182
Age squared 0.079 0.228 0.347
Number of young children 1.519 0.294 5.165
Number of medium children 2.560 0.166 15.463
Spouse age 0.382 0.375 1.019
Husband Francophone 0.335 0.489 0.685
Husband allophone 1.132 0.388 2.917
House owner -0.781 0.335 -2.329
City residence -0.030 0.283 -0.107
Education beyond High School 0.173 0.253 0.684
Region Atlantic -1.897 1.101 -1.723
Region Quebec 0.188 0.650 0.289
Region Prairies -1.165 0.670 -1.740
Region British Columbia -0.264 0.751 -0.352
ln (Price of Food) 12.371 5.208 2.375
ln (Price of Household Operations) -0.232 7.680 -0.030
ln (Price of Tobacco) -4.428 1.692 -2.618
ln (Price of Alcohol) 18.060 7.915 2.282
ln (Price of clothing) -3.814 2.958 -1.289
ln (Price of Restaurant) -4.086 5.485 -0.745
ln (Price of Gas) 0.362 2.251 0.161
ln (Price of Care) -3.789 2.160 -1.754
ln (Price of Transportation) -7.724 3.008 -2.567
ln (Price of Services) 3.276 3.640 0.900
ln (Price of Suppl) -1.896 8.504 -0.223
ln (Price of Recreation) 8.101 6.825 1.187
ln (Price of Furn) -12.529 8.518 -1.471
ln (Price of Carp) -9.571 6.934 -1.380
ln (Total Expenditure) 17.740 13.695 1.295
ln (Total Expenditure) Squared -4.253 1.999 -2.127
Rho -3.886 1.709 -2.273
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Table D2: Parameter Estimates of the Caring Collective Model.
Flat-slope-‡at model
Household Operations
Coe¢cient Standard Error T-Value
Constant 45.181 20.443 2.210
Age -0.191 0.268 -0.715
Age squared -0.128 0.174 -0.732
Number of young children 0.439 0.209 2.097
Number of medium children 0.242 0.111 2.184
Spouse age 0.962 0.275 3.501
Husband Francophone -0.980 0.356 -2.754
Husband allophone -0.245 0.257 -0.952
House owner 2.611 0.248 10.528
City residence -1.119 0.203 -5.516
Education beyond High School -0.236 0.181 -1.304
Region Atlantic 0.928 0.761 1.219
Region Quebec -0.249 0.458 -0.545
Region Prairies -0.440 0.457 -0.963
Region British Columbia -1.092 0.527 -2.072
ln (Price of Food) -5.997 3.694 -1.624
ln (Price of Household Operations) 8.864 5.208 1.702
ln (Price of Tobacco) -1.289 1.180 -1.092
ln (Price of Alcohol) 2.932 5.593 0.524
ln (Price of clothing) 1.221 2.005 0.609
ln (Price of Restaurant) 1.846 3.867 0.477
ln (Price of Gas) -1.907 1.537 -1.241
ln (Price of Care) -2.117 1.547 -1.368
ln (Price of Transportation) -1.751 2.076 -0.844
ln (Price of Services) 3.179 2.461 1.292
ln (Price of Suppl) -4.737 5.945 -0.797
ln (Price of Recreation) -6.381 4.886 -1.306
ln (Price of Furn) 4.473 5.924 0.755
ln (Price of Carp) 4.953 5.052 0.980
ln (Total Expenditure) -25.455 10.559 -2.411
ln (Total Expenditure) Squared 3.318 1.547 2.145
Rho -2.524 1.273 -1.982
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Table D3: Parameter Estimates of the Caring Collective Model.
Flat-slope-‡at model
Women’s clothing
Coe¢cient Standard Error T-Value
Constant 6.745 12.944 0.521
Age -0.089 0.183 -0.486
Age squared -0.180 0.103 -1.737
Number of young children -1.255 0.150 -8.358
Number of medium children -0.783 0.087 -8.989
Spouse age -0.029 0.228 -0.125
Husband francophone 0.411 0.267 1.536
Husband allophone 0.565 0.221 2.560
House owner -0.075 0.174 -0.431
City residence -0.127 0.154 -0.825
Education beyond High School -0.202 0.147 -1.378
Region Atlantic -0.576 0.644 -0.895
Region Quebec 0.110 0.345 0.319
Region Prairies -0.063 0.372 -0.170
Region British Columbia -0.785 0.429 -1.832
ln (Price of Food) -1.887 3.097 -0.609
ln (Price of Household Operations) 1.335 4.436 0.301
ln (Price of Tobacco) -1.495 0.925 -1.616
ln (Price of Alcohol) 5.754 4.382 1.313
ln (Price of clothing) -1.535 1.686 -0.910
ln (Price of Restaurant) 1.870 3.095 0.604
ln (Price of Gas) -1.147 1.250 -0.918
ln (Price of Care) -1.036 1.211 -0.856
ln (Price of Transportation) -0.333 1.688 -0.197
ln (Price of Services) -1.829 2.078 -0.880
ln (Price of Suppl) 1.073 4.671 0.230
ln (Price of Recreation) -1.759 3.915 -0.449
ln (Price of Furn) 1.444 4.965 0.291
ln (Price of Carp) -1.304 3.902 -0.334
ln (Total Expenditure) -1.171 6.241 -0.188
ln (Total Expenditure) Squared 0.700 0.934 0.749
Rho 3.314 0.887 3.736
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Table D4: Parameter Estimates of the Caring Collective Model.
Flat-slope-‡at model
Men’s clothing
Coe¢cient Standard Error T-Value
Constant 26.000 9.528 2.729
Age 0.007 0.132 0.051
Age squared -0.088 0.072 -1.227
Number of young children -0.509 0.112 -4.537
Number of medium children -0.332 0.061 -5.429
Spouse age -0.105 0.152 -0.694
Husband francophone 0.316 0.176 1.796
Husband allophone 0.314 0.151 2.074
House owner 0.013 0.133 0.095
City residence -0.093 0.110 -0.840
Education beyond High School -0.350 0.105 -3.337
Region Atlantic 0.126 0.474 0.265
Region Quebec 0.337 0.244 1.378
Region Prairies 0.053 0.264 0.199
Region British Columbia -0.303 0.290 -1.042
ln (Price of Food) 1.455 2.022 0.719
ln (Price of Household Operations) -1.332 3.070 -0.434
ln (Price of Tobacco) 0.335 0.684 0.490
ln (Price of Alcohol) 1.748 3.138 0.557
ln (Price of clothing) -1.847 1.261 -1.465
ln (Price of Restaurant) -0.419 2.247 -0.187
ln (Price of Gas) -1.425 0.883 -1.613
ln (Price of Care) -0.233 0.869 -0.268
ln (Price of Transportation) 0.200 1.236 0.162
ln (Price of Services) -0.054 1.427 -0.038
ln (Price of Suppl) 4.935 3.443 1.433
ln (Price of Recreation) -6.468 2.713 -2.384
ln (Price of Furn) 5.227 3.422 1.528
ln (Price of Carp) -3.070 2.679 -1.146
ln (Total Expenditure) -12.017 4.819 -2.494
ln (Total Expenditure) Squared 2.093 0.728 2.873
Rho -1.335 0.689 -1.939
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Table D5: Parameter Estimates of the Caring Collective Model.
Flat-slope-‡at model
Kid’s clothing
Coe¢cient Standard Error T-Value
Constant -0.188 8.328 -0.023
Age 0.205 0.124 1.651
Age squared -0.193 0.082 -2.345
Number of young children 0.183 0.111 1.655
Number of medium children 1.037 0.067 15.390
Spouse age -0.179 0.138 -1.298
Husband francophone 0.117 0.158 0.745
Husband allophone 0.025 0.124 0.202
House owner -0.071 0.102 -0.697
City residence -0.252 0.098 -2.585
Education beyond High School 0.043 0.085 0.502
Region Atlantic 0.570 0.354 1.612
Region Quebec 0.016 0.197 0.082
Region Prairies 0.191 0.224 0.854
Region British Columbia -0.343 0.237 -1.445
ln (Price of Food) 0.469 1.708 0.274
ln (Price of Household Operations) -4.568 2.438 -1.873
ln (Price of Tobacco) -0.860 0.570 -1.508
ln (Price of Alcohol) -0.082 2.629 -0.031
ln (Price of clothing) -2.782 1.015 -2.741
ln (Price of Restaurant) 2.836 1.779 1.594
ln (Price of Gas) -0.586 0.711 -0.825
ln (Price of Care) 0.576 0.726 0.794
ln (Price of Transportation) -0.087 0.967 -0.090
ln (Price of Services) -0.838 1.133 -0.739
ln (Price of Suppl) 6.626 2.787 2.377
ln (Price of Recreation) 2.586 2.349 1.101
ln (Price of Furn) -2.007 2.790 -0.719
ln (Price of Carp) -0.690 2.394 -0.288
ln (Total Expenditure) -0.173 4.103 -0.042
ln (Total Expenditure) Squared -0.001 0.608 -0.001
Rho 1.542 0.585 2.637
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Table D6: Parameter Estimates of the Caring Collective Model.
Flat-slope-‡at model
Vices
Coe¢cient Standard Error T-Value
Constant 7.109 23.716 0.300
Age -0.132 0.296 -0.444
Age squared -0.013 0.178 -0.072
Number of young children -0.764 0.229 -3.334
Number of medium children -0.242 0.130 -1.853
Spouse age -0.333 0.346 -0.962
Husband francophone 0.244 0.347 0.702
Husband allophone -1.350 0.285 -4.746
House owner -1.423 0.275 -5.178
City residence 0.433 0.220 1.972
Education beyond High School 1.223 0.207 5.900
Region Atlantic -0.684 0.886 -0.772
Region Quebec -0.207 0.485 -0.426
Region Prairies -0.440 0.533 -0.826
Region British Columbia -0.379 0.579 -0.654
ln (Price of Food) 0.834 4.152 0.201
ln (Price of Household Operations) 0.941 5.766 0.163
ln (Price of Tobacco) -0.674 1.272 -0.530
ln (Price of Alcohol) 7.868 6.400 1.230
ln (Price of clothing) -4.686 2.387 -1.963
ln (Price of Restaurant) -3.230 4.381 -0.737
ln (Price of Gas) 1.150 1.608 0.715
ln (Price of Care) -2.398 1.750 -1.370
ln (Price of Transportation) -1.816 2.376 -0.764
ln (Price of Services) 2.749 2.679 1.026
ln (Price of Suppl) -4.300 6.766 -0.636
ln (Price of Recreation) -1.287 5.573 -0.231
ln (Price of Furn) 7.371 7.018 1.050
ln (Price of Carp) -4.336 5.658 -0.766
ln (Total Expenditure) 5.156 12.245 0.421
ln (Total Expenditure) Squared -0.838 1.791 -0.468
Rho -1.424 1.390 -1.024
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